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DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/RPM AND EUR/ERA

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SUBJECT: EUR PDAS BRADTKE'S SEPTEMBER 27 DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EU

Classified By: USEU Political Military Officer Jeremy Brenner for reasons 1,5 (b) and (d).

11. (C) Summary: Visiting EUR PDAS Robert Bradtke covered a wide range of topics in meetings with the EU Political and Security Committee Troika and Director General Robert Cooper on September 27. The US and the EU voiced support for UNSCR 1564 regarding Darfur, and the EU sought consultations with the US on a "division of labor" in Sudan. On Russia/Moldova/Georgia, neither the US nor the EU found grounds for optimism regarding December OSCE Ministerials, but both insisted that Istanbul Commitments must come before ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty. The EU shares the US view on MONUC and the Great Lakes, that there is a need for a stronger mandate and higher force levels. In Afghanistan, the US is looking for a way to merge ISAF with OEF, while the EU expands its efforts at Democracy support. On Operation Althea in Bosnia, the US desire to vest final Dayton authority in DSACEUR met considerable resistance from the EU side. EU battlegroups are moving ahead, with EU assurances that they and the NATO Response Force (NRF) will be mutually reinforcing. US underscored concern about lifting of EU arms embargoes on Libya and China. End summary.

Sudan/Darfur

12. (C) PDAS Bradtke pointed out the high level of interest within the USG over developments in Darfur. He noted that the Secretary had characterized the situation as "genocide,"

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giving high profile impetus to our desire to speed the deployment of African Union monitors. Bradtke took note of the significant EU contribution, and reiterated the US pledge of an additional 20 million dollars. Bradtke lamented the apparent hesitance by the AU to accept assistance with their military mission on offer, but pointed to hopeful signs of a greater willingness to work with experts after meetings last week in New York.

13. (C) The EU Presidency underlined the EU's full support for UNSCR 1564, and called for intensified pressure on the parties. The EU continues to look at options, including the imposition of sanctions. Dutch Presidency representative Ambassador Alphons Hamer noted the urgent need to get peace talks back on track in October when discussions resume. The EU Commission is looking at ways to mobilize funds for the Peace Facility. Hamer referred to AU requests for planning assistance, and said that there was a need for realistic cooperation based on the AU's capacities. He noted a North/South linkage to the situation in Darfur, and said it was vital that all sides understand that no one can expect to gain from the stalemate.

14. (C) Deputy Director General for European Defense and Security Policy, Peter Feith -- recently returned from a fact-finding mission to the region -- said the AU needs assistance in planning, logistics, and funding. In planning, Feith emphasized the need to get the right mix. He urged that donors focus on building AU capacity, such as headquarters operations in Addis and Khartoum. He argued against a focus on protection forces, but called for monitors to reach out to remote areas. He said that the UN has shown some flexibility, and he urged that we build on -- and phase in -- the Caemmert plan. Feith supports a significant police component as part of the overall mission in Darfur, believing that a police presence might alleviate the need for military protectors.

15. (C) With regard to logistics, Feith cited a need for lift and transport assets as well as covering accommodation costs for the deployed units in Darfur. He suggested continued close coordination with a view to arriving at a division of labor between the EU and the US. Feith asked for US views on where this coordination could best take place. On funding issues, the EU Commission observed that the EU cannot simply become the "paymaster" of the African Union. Funding, including a tranche of funds for the Peace Facility, must be undertaken with reasonable and efficient planning in place, and it must contribute to capacity building within the AU. There can be no question of releasing additional funds if the EU is "uncomfortable" with the AU's strategic approach. In an earlier meeting, Director General for Common Foreign and

Security Policy, Robert Cooper, told Bradtke that the EU envisions a larger role in Addis, but he did not expect Europeans to play a major role on the ground in Darfur -- other than the small group of observers already there.

16. (C) USEU Charge called for realistic engagement, noting that there are three provincial capitals within Darfur, and that the AU has been unable to develop acceptable accounting mechanisms. He also said there was a need for planning cells in Addis Ababa and Khartoum.

17. (C) Observers, and Police training. PDAS Bradtke outlined the US hope to see a force of 1500 observers deployed by the end of October as part of an eventual total of 3500. He said that meetings in New York had been used to accelerate the deployment process. Bradtke noted that the AU has no policing capability and asked who the EU would plan to work with if it undertook a police training mission, given that the Sudanese security forces are part of the problem.

18. (C) Feith outlined three options for a police mission to Darfur. The first would be an EU-only operation, which he said was unlikely to find consensus among EU member states. The second option would be an ESDP mission with 50 senior police advisors in an EU chain of Command to mentor, monitor, advise, and train local police under an AU or UN umbrella. The third option would be an AU Police Mission with EU trainers within a Sudanese chain of command. The trainers would serve to steer the Sudanese command away from embarking on harmful or undesirable missions.

19. (C) USEU PolMinCouns asked whether the deployment of unarmed monitors did not risk creating a situation where international observers might witness atrocities taking place, but could do nothing to stop them. Feith responded by saying that this would not be the case if the mandate and key supporting tasks for the protectors called for protection of civilian populations. He also said that the presence of unarmed observers had been shown to have a deterrent effect against attacks against civilians.

10. (C) NAC-PSC Consultations. Bradtke pointed out that UNSYG Annan had approached both the EU and NATO seeking support in Darfur. Under these circumstances, it was a particular disadvantage that the issue could not be raised in NAC-PSC sessions because of the ongoing political question over participation by Cyprus and Malta in NATO-EU discussions. This made consultations difficult in an area that could be appropriately covered under the provisions of the Berlin Plus Agreements. The EU Presidency replied by acknowledging that this was a strange situation, but that the issue could only be dealt with by all 25 EU member states. He urged greater contacts between the NATO International Staff and the EUMS as one way around the blockage. Bradtke said that NATO could become involved under the right circumstances, but it would depend upon a specific request for assistance. EU representatives observed that there is a "siege mentality" within the AU, and that additional "non-african faces" as part of the mission would be a sensitive matter. In the earlier meeting, Robert Cooper, suggested that coordination could best be carried out via talks between Peter Feith and NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Crisis Management and Operations, Robert Serry. Cooper recommended against holding the discussions at the senior political level (Solana- De Hoop Scheffer) and the NAC-PSC is not feasible because of the Cyprus-Malta problem. Cooper also suggested that it would be difficult for the AU to accept a NATO role. He pointed out that even with all the EU's money, they have found it difficult to gain entrance to the AU HQ in Addis. "Everything is political with the AU," Cooper concluded.

#### Georgia/Moldova: Istanbul Commitments

11. (C) Ambassador Hamer opened the discussion by observing that the EU continued to insist upon fulfillment of Russia's Istanbul commitments. However, Hamer warned against holding any high expectations for the December OSCE Ministerials. On Moldova, Hamer noted that only a single ammunition repatriation train has left Moldova this year. He said that the EU tries to work with Moscow within the OSCE, but there is a need for the US to push the Russians in the right direction. The prospect is not promising for regional declarations at Sofia, since they are not likely to find agreement in Moscow.

12. (C) PDAS Bradtke expressed US appreciation for the close cooperation of the EU on this issue. Although we did not succeed in Maastricht on obtaining a ministerial declaration on regional issues, the Russians did not divide us. The joint US-EU visa ban on members of the Transnistrian regime was an example of our positive cooperation. While the US shares the EU's pessimism concerning the OSCE Ministerial, we must stick to our bedrock principle that the Istanbul commitments must come before ratification of the amended CFE. Bradtke wondered if there were other possibilities to make progress

on OSCE issues at the December Ministerial, noting that Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov had recently taken a less threatening posture toward the OSCE. He warned, however, that the Russians hold an extremely negative view of Georgian President Saakashvili. In his earlier meeting with Robert Cooper, Bradtke said that Russian FM Lavrov had expressed critical views of the Georgian PM in meetings with the Secretary. The PSC Troika participants agreed that the US

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and the EU must stay in close touch in the run-up to the OSCE Ministerials in Sofia.

13. (C) Ambassador Hamer suggested that Moscow has shown more openness to an EU role in the Caucasus. He said that EU envoy Talvitie believed it would be possible to bring about the withdrawal of 3000 Russian military personnel by negotiation. Both the EU and the US expressed concern over recent moves by Russian President Putin that bring into question the direction of democratic development in Russia. PDAS Bradtke cited a need to stay engaged with Moscow on Counter-Terrorism, but said the US is keeping a close eye on internal developments.

14. (C) Robert Cooper told Bradtke that the EU had noted a change in atmosphere recently, with some "real Soviet stuff" coming from FM Lavrov. He cited continuing Russian assertiveness vis-a-vis the Baltics, which has now become more pronounced also with regard to Lithuania (regarding Kaliningrad transit). Cooper also reported that the Russians have told the EU that they are not ready to discuss Moldova since it is "a former part of the USSR." According to Cooper, the Russians are relatively pleased with the functioning of the NATO-Russia Council and point to it as the "gold standard" they would like to emulate in their contacts with the EU. Cooper said that this kind of 25 plus 1 mechanism would not work with the EU, and they were not prepared to pursue it.

MONUC/Great Lakes

15. (C) The Presidency said the EU is supportive of a more robust and focused MONUC. They call for strong international monitoring, with a strengthened mandate and access to information -- including satellite imagery. There is also a need for better coordination in Kinshasa. The EU has taken concrete steps toward a December launch of a civilian ESDP mission to conduct fact-finding and to help reinforce internal security within the DRC. This would be the first civilian ESDP mission outside Europe. Per Bradtke, the US shares the EU's support for stronger MONUC mandate and force levels. USEU Charge pointed out the need to consider the Rules of Engagement for an expanded MONUC.

Afghanistan

16. (C) PDAS Bradtke noted the very high US priority attached to elections in Afghanistan. On the positive side, there have been 10 million people registered to vote, of whom 40 percent are women. Three million refugees returned to the country. Bradtke credited Eurocorps with a smooth takeover of command of ISAF and commended the stage one expansion of ISAF. He said that challenges remain, including finding the appropriate relationship between ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom. Problems with warlords and narcotics traffic must be resolved. Bradtke said that the end-state should be a merger of ISAF and OEF. It remains to identify the right timeline.

17. (C) For the EU, narcotics remain a significant threat, and there is still great concern over the security situation. Democracy, development, and reconstruction remain at the heart of EU policy in Afghanistan. The EU Election Monitoring Mission in Afghanistan will mobilize teams to visit Islamabad and Teheran to examine registration programs for out-of-country refugees. Bradtke commended the OSCE monitoring mission under Ambassador Barry.

Operation Althea

18. (C) Ambassador Hamer referred to what he characterized as an "unhelpful" interpretation of a NAC decision sheet that prevented discussions of non-Berlin Plus issues such as Sudan and Afghanistan in broader NATO-EU fora. On the transfer of SFOR to Operation Althea, Hamer cited the need for intel sharing, since EUFOR would be intelligence driven, based on a robust situational awareness. He said there would be three EUFOR sectors as currently exist under SFOR: Tuzla, Mostar and Banja Luka. He recognized that the US wants a December 2 Transfer of Authority in Tuzla, but said that NATO must so advise the EU. While the issue of reserves was dealt with at the earlier NAC-PSC (see septel), Hamer confirmed that all nations currently in SFOR would be invited to participate in the force generation process for EUFOR.

19. (C) Bradtke pointed out that a number of allies find the costs being allocated by the EU to be exorbitant and

disproportionate. He reaffirmed the US commitment to Bosnia stability, pointing out that the US will fill 44 of 150 billets in the NATO HQ and provide a number of support personnel to General Schook.

120. (C) Bradtke concluded that the smooth transition process has shown that Berlin Plus can work, proving the naysayers wrong. Cooper agreed, telling Bradtke that Berlin Plus mechanisms were functioning, but it would be up to the new DSACEUR to make it work smoothly. Cooper noted that Turkey was not helping the process with its restricted interpretation of strategic cooperation. (The Greek Cypriots, Cooper acknowledged, have also behaved "unspeakably.")

121. (C) Dayton Final Authority. Bradtke identified one remaining point that should be resolved before debate begins on a new UNSCR in October. Bradtke said that the US had concluded there was a need to further clarify the issue of the successor to COMIFOR/SFOR as the final authority on military matters under the Dayton GFAP. Once SFOR ceased to exist, there is a need to vest that final authority in someone. The US position is that this authority should be vested in DSACEUR as the operational commander in both the NATO and EUFOR chains of command. DSACEUR could then delegate that authority to the EUFOR commander and the NATO HQ commander as necessary in conjunction with delineated tasks. The US would not accept that the final authority be vested in COMEUFOR.

122. (C) Peter Feith expressed concern about designating DSACEUR as the final authority. He wondered whether the US was trying to move the goalposts at this late date, or if the issue were even necessary. Feith said it was important -- both politically and psychologically -- that COMEUFOR not be seen as having any less authority than was held by COMSFOR. All parties have agreed that COMEUFOR will have full authority in addressing and assessing issues of non-compliance under Dayton, and that authority cannot be qualified or delegated as suggested by the US position. Bradtke assured Feith that there is no ambiguity concerning COMEUFOR's "full Dayton authority" in his areas of responsibility, but that we did not accept that COMEUFOR would be vested with the "final" authority. Ambassador Hamer argued that this issue must be raised within NATO, where "we will deal with it. Bradtke reiterated that this was not a question of moving the goalposts, but a legal issue raised by lawyers. The US would prefer to resolve the issue before it becomes an issue for negotiation within the UNSC, where we want to avoid non-participating UNSC members causing mischief. He argued that DSACEUR could delegate final authority to the commanders, leaving COMEUFOR's credibility unchallenged. It was agreed that further discussions of this issue are needed.

123. (C) Exchange of letters on Reserves. PDAS Bradtke responded to a question from Feith about an exchange of letters on reserves by saying that the US has not proposed such an exchange but supports the idea within NATO that such an exchange could specify how the parallel decisionmaking processes in NATO and the EU would work. Robert Cooper noted the importance of arriving at an agreement that avoided language on "joint decisions" but allows for parallel decision-making" in both NATO and the EU.

124. (C) Kosovo. In earlier discussions, Robert Cooper voiced the EU's support for the ideas contained in the Eide Report and noted that doing nothing was clearly not an option. Bradtke said the US generally agrees with the EU's assessment of the report, and that we are committed to staying in KFOR.

#### EU Battlegroups

25, (C) Ambassador Hamer told the US delegation that the EU plans for Initial Operational Capability of high-readiness battlegroups by 2005, with Full Operational Capability by 2007. The EU ambition is to be able to launch a mission within 5 days in response to a request from the UNSYG. The most probable mission would be to act as a bridging operation by intervening quickly in a crisis situation, thereby giving time to the UN to organize its own intervention force. Hammer assured Bradtke that the EU battlegroups and the NATO Response Force (NRF) would be mutually reinforcing, both in terms of capabilities and timelines for deployment.

126. (C) Bradtke welcomed EU initiatives to improve capabilities, and cited the positive discussions within the EU-NATO capabilities working group to ensure common standards. He reiterated the need to harmonize the battlegroups and the NRF, asking about the creation of the NATO liaison cell within the EU. He urged further discussions within the Capabilities Working Group on standards and certification processes.

127. (C) Hamer said that the EU envisioned a "large number" -- from 8 to 9 -- battlegroups to be eventually available to

meet the EU ambition. He argued that the battlegroup concept had to be dealt with by all 25 member states under the principle of inclusiveness. He said that excluding Cyprus and Malta from discussions or participation was neither acceptable nor desirable. Battlegroups are seen as a "welcome lever" on capabilities development.

#### Iraq

128. (C) Per Bradtke, the US priorities in Iraq revolve around supporting the electoral process, including support for a UN protection force. The assessed requirement is for three 600-man battalions at an estimated cost of USD 24 million for six months. Potential troop contributors include Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Romania and Georgia, though there are unresolved problems. Such a force is critical to the UN presence. EU funds are needed to support these deployments. Bradtke asked that any planned EU police mission be closely coordinated with existing programs underway in Jordan.

129. (C) Peter Feith explained that he will lead an EU civilian crisis management fact-finding mission to Iraq in mid-October to assess the possibilities for an EU police training mission. He foresaw a positive EU role in the areas of Rule of Law, Police Training, and Civil administration. The fact-finding mission was tasked by the Council and will travel to Basra and Baghdad, where he asked US assistance in making broad contacts. One part of the mission will visit Amman. Ambassador Hamer said that the EU will be as generous as possible on election support via the UN Iraq Stabilization Fund. He wondered about the cost of the protection force -- projected by the UN at USD 26 million -- asking what the funds would be for and how they would be dispersed.

130. (C) Bradtke offered that the bulk of the cost would be for salaries, and said he would check to see if there would be costs for insurance associated with the force. The US will provide lift and sustainment resources, but cannot pay salaries. He asked if there were legal restrictions on the Commission's ability to provide funds for such a protection force. Michel Caillouet, Deputy Political Director, replied that he "could not say it was impossible" for the Commission to provide funding for the inner protective circle. Both the US and the EU were in agreement that the 13 percent overhead charges proposed by the UN to act as administrator/disbursement agent was too high. Bradtke wondered whether one of the contributing nations might be able to perform the function by distributing money from a fund into which other contributors could pay.

#### China/Libya Arms Embargoes

131. (C) In addition to the agreed agenda, PDAS Bradtke raised the issue of existing arms embargoes on China and Libya. He urged that the EU not lift these embargoes. On Libya, although Qaddafi has come a long way, he still had not received a "clean bill of health." There are questions related to an attempt on Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah's life, and lingering human rights concerns. The treatment of the Bulgarian medics held in Libya is especially troubling. Ambassador Hamer agreed that the treatment of the medics is disgraceful. He took note of the US views, stating only that the issue of the Libyan embargo will come before the Council at the October 12-13 General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC).

132. (C) Bradtke also expressed strong concern that weapons sold to China might be used against US forces, especially in the Taiwan Straits. He also said that lifting the embargo would send the wrong message on human rights. Hamer said the US views were well known, and being taken into consideration by the EU as it weighs its decision. He replied that even if the embargo were lifted, no one anticipates a flood of weapons sales to China. He posited that, while there may remain some human rights concerns, China does not belong in the same category as Zimbabwe or Sudan.

133. (U) PDAS Bradtke has cleared this message.

McKinley